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Background: Nepal is one of the post-conflict countries affected by violence from explosive devices. We undertook
this study to assess the magnitude of injuries due to intentional explosions in Nepal during 2008-2011 and to
describe time trends and epidemiologic patterns for these events.
Methods: We analyzed surveillance data on fatal and non-fatal injuries due to intentional explosions in Nepal that
occurred between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2011. The case definition included casualties injured or killed
by explosive devices knowingly activated by an individual or a group of individuals with the intent to harm, hurt or
terrorize. Data were collected through media-based and active community-based surveillance.
Results: Analysis included 437 casualties injured or killed in 131 intentional explosion incidents. A decrease in the
number of incidents and casualties between January 2008 and June 2009 was followed by a pronounced increase
between July 2010 and June 2011. Eighty-four (19.2%) casualties were among females and 40 (9.2%) were among
children under 18 years of age. Fifty-nine (45.3%) incidents involved one casualty, 47 (35.9%) involved 2 to 4
casualties, and 6 involved more than 10 casualties. The overall case-fatality ratio was 7.8%. The highest numbers of
incidents occurred in streets or at crossroads, in victims’ homes, and in shops or markets. Incidents on buses and
near stadiums claimed the highest numbers of casualties per incident. Socket, sutali, and pressure cooker bombs
caused the highest numbers of incidents.
Conclusions: Intentional explosion incidents still pose a threat to the civilian population of Nepal. Most incidents
are caused by small homemade explosive devices and occur in public places, and males aged 20 to 39 account for
a plurality of casualties. Stakeholders addressing the explosive device problem in Nepal should continue to use
surveillance data to plan interventions.
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Explosive devices continue to maim, kill, and terrorize
civilian populations worldwide despite new and continu-
ing efforts to prevent injury and assist victims, increas-
ing attention from various global actors, and novel
prohibitions and limitations in formal and customary
humanitarian law [1]. During 2011 alone, Action on
Armed Violence’s Explosive Violence Monitoring Project
(EVMP) recorded 30,127 casualties of explosive devices* Correspondence: obilukha1@cdc.gov
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orfrom 2,522 incidents in 68 countries worldwide [2]. Of
particular concern is the disproportionate civilian burden
of fatal and non-fatal injuries: 71% casualties recorded by
EVMP in 2011 were civilians. EVMP reported that such a
preponderance of injuries among civilians is common
“across a range of explosive weapons types, delivery
methods, and intended targets” [2].
In recent years, explosive violence has received in-
creasing attention on the global stage. In 2009, for
example, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon stated that he was “increasingly concerned at
the humanitarian impact of explosive weapons, in par-
ticular when used in densely populated areas” andLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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dress this issue [3]. The following year, the Secretary-
General urged all relevant parties to support “more
systematic data collection and analysis of the human
costs of [explosive device] use” in order to better under-
stand “the humanitarian impact of these weapons” [4].
Nepal is one among many post-conflict countries af-
fected by violence from explosive devices. The 1996-
2006 armed conflict between the Government of Nepal
and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN/M)
resulted in an estimated 12,000 deaths and the displace-
ment of over 100,000 persons [5]. Although the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in
November 2006 and the CPN/M has since entered the
parliamentary process and intermittently joined the gov-
ernment, political tensions remain high. Dozens of
armed groups have emerged following the signing of the
CPA and are active in certain regions of the country, es-
pecially in the southern region of Nepal (Terai belt) [6].
Persistent post-conflict explosive violence perpetrated
with the intent to kill, maim, and terrorize is attributed
to multiple factors, including political instability, prolif-
eration of politically and criminally motivated armed
groups, increased access to explosive devices, discrimin-
ation based on ethnicity and religion, poverty, un-
employment, and poor security [7-9].
Survivors of explosive violence endure physical pain,
critical psychological sequelae, and disability. Families of
casualties face significant socioeconomic losses, and af-
fected communities suffer from the destruction of crit-
ical infrastructure, environmental consequences, and
collective psychological and social trauma [8,10]. In
Nepal as a whole, explosive violence poses a threat to
the peace and reconciliation process and impedes eco-
nomic and social development [8,10]. Unfortunately,
there are no published peer reviewed studies describing
the epidemiology of intentional explosion incidents and
casualties in Nepal, and therefore very limited data are
available to guide interventions to address this problem.
We undertook this study to assess the magnitude of
fatal and non-fatal injuries due to intentionala explosions
in Nepal during 2008-2011 and to describe time trends
and epidemiologic patterns for these events.Methods
Data on injuries due to intentional explosions in Nepal
were obtained from the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) and the Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC).
INSEC is a Nepali non-governmental organization (NGO)
with the primary mission of promoting policies, institutions
and capacity that contribute to the protection and pro-
motion of human rights. INSEC personnel collect injury
surveillance data and manage the casualty database. Thedatabase included injuries that occurred over a four-year
period between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2011.
INSEC implemented nationwide prospective surveil-
lance for injuries due to intentional explosions in January
2008 in collaboration with UNICEF. INSEC supported
staff members called “District Representatives” (DRs) in
each of Nepal’s 75 districts. DRs produced “Human Rights
(HR) reports” on a wide range of human rights violations
(e.g., incidents of kidnapping, intentional explosions, tor-
ture, extrajudicial killing, etc.) occurring in their districts.
INSEC surveillance staff monitored HR reports mentioned
above as well as local and national media in Nepali and
English for intentional explosion incidents that resulted in
human casualties and abstracted data on victim demo-
graphics and incident dates, locations and circumstances
from these reports. Active community-based surveillance
began in October 2009, when injury data collection form
was introduced and DRs were trained in casualty data
collection using this form. DRs monitored community
networks (e.g., local police, district administrators, village-
level authorities, local media and partner NGOs) to iden-
tify incidents of intentional explosions as soon as they
occurred. After obtaining each initial incident report, the
respective DR visited the site and interviewed the victim,
family member of the victim, or eyewitness using a stan-
dardized data collection form mentioned above. Informa-
tion collected included the incident date and location,
victim demographics, incident circumstances (e.g., type of
setting where the incident occurred, type of explosive de-
vice that caused the incident), and whether the injury
resulted in death. Pictures of different explosive devices
were used to help the victim identify the type of device
causing the incident. Verbal informed consent was
obtained prior to each interview.
The case definition used by the surveillance system in-
cluded casualties injured or killed by explosive devices
knowingly activated by an individual or a group of indi-
viduals with the intent to harm, hurt or terrorize. The
case definition excluded casualties of unintentionally ac-
tivated explosive devices (for example, injury from step-
ping on a landmine or injury from tampering with
abandoned ordnance); victims injured directly during ac-
tive fighting (e.g., those injured by bullets, artillery or
rocket projectiles, or aerial bombing); casualties injured
by explosive devices used for fishing, hunting, road con-
struction or other purposes where the intent was not to
harm or terrorize; and casualties with minor injuries that
did not require medical treatment. “Incident” was de-
fined as the explosion of an improvised explosive device
(IED) or other explosive device resulting in one or more
casualties as defined above. “IED” was defined as a
homemade (as opposed to industrially manufactured)
explosive device. Examples of IEDs commonly used in
Nepal include socket bombs (improvised hand grenades
Figure 2 Sutali bomb.
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(small explosive devices wrapped in rope, Figure 2), and
pressure cooker bombs (pressure cookers filled with ex-
plosives, Figure 3).
A trained data manager checked the database for du-
plicate entries by comparing victim demographics and
incident times and locations. Statistical analyses were
performed using JMP software (release 9.0.1, SAS Insti-
tute Inc., Cary, NC). The Institutional Review Board of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
exempted this study from review because it involved sec-
ondary analysis of routinely collected surveillance data
used for programmatic purposes. Personal identifiers
were not included in the final data set used for analysis.
Results
Analysis included 437 casualties injured or killed in 131
intentional explosion incidents between January 2008
and December 2011. Fifty-nine (45.3%) incidents in-
volved one casualty, 47 (35.9%) involved 2 to 4 casual-
ties, 19 (14.5%) involved 5 to 10 casualties, and 6
involved more than 10 (11, 13, 14, 14, 26 and 41) casual-
ties (Table 1). Time trends in the numbers of casualties
and incidents are presented in Figure 4. Following a de-
crease in the number of incidents and casualties between
January 2008 and June 2009, there was a pronounced in-
crease between July 2010 and June 2011. Overall, 341
(78.0%) injuries were among males and 84 (19.2%) were
among females; the sex of 12 (2.7%) casualties was un-
known. 286 (65.4%) casualties were adults, 40 (9.2%)
were children (under 18 years of age), and the age of
111 casualties (25.4%) was unknown (Table 2). The
mean age of casualties with known age was 31.6 years
(standard deviation 13.5; range: 2 to 70 years). The dis-
tribution of injuries by age group and sex is presented in
Figure 5. The highest number of injuries occurred
among individuals between 20 and 39 years of age. The
overall case-fatality ratio was 7.8%.Figure 1 Socket bomb.Intentional explosion incidents occurred in 27 of 75
districts in Nepal. Overall, 85.5% of incidents (112 of
131) and 86.7% of injuries (379 of 437) occurred in the
southern region of Nepal (Terai belt). Of nineteen inci-
dents that occurred outside of Terai belt, nine took place
in Kathmandu and its vicinity (Kathmandu and Lalitpur
districts), accounting for 59.9% of all injuries (33 of 58)
that occurred outside of Terai belt.
The highest number of incidents occurred in streets or
at crossroads (31 or 23.7%), in victims’ homes (25 or
19.1%), and in shops or markets (15 or 11.5%). Other
common places of incidents included industrial settings
(7), buses (7), government and police offices (6), places
of worship (5), schools and hospitals (4), and stadiums
(2) (Table 1). Incidents on buses and near stadiums
claimed the highest numbers of casualties per incident
(61 casualties in 7 incidents and 44 casualties in 2 inci-
dents, respectively).Figure 3 Pressure cooker bomb.
Table 1 Distribution of incidents due to intentional explosions by surveillance type, Nepal, 2008-2011 (N = 131)
Media surveillance Active surveillance Total incidents
Jan 08 –Sep 09 Oct 09 – Dec 11 N (% total)
N (% total) N (% total)
Type of explosive device
Socket bomb 22 (22.0) 14 (45.2) 36 (27.4)
Sutali bomb 23 (23.0) 4 (12.9) 27 (20.6)
Pressure cooker bomb 3 (3.0) 2 (6.5) 5 (3.8)
Other improvised explosive device 11 (11.0) 6 (19.4) 17 (13.0)
Unknown 41 (41.0) 5 (16.1) 46 (35.1)
Place of incident
Busy street or crossroads 25 (25.0) 6 (19.4) 31 (23.7)
Shop or market 10 (10.0) 5 (16.1) 15 (11.5)
Place of worship 5 (5.0) 0 (0) 5 (3.8)
Near government or police office 5 (5.0) 1 (3.2) 6 (4.6)
Near school or hospital 4 (4.0) 0 (0) 4 (3.1)
Near stadium 2 (2.0) 0 (0) 2 (1.5)
Factory or industry 6 (6.0) 1 (3.2) 7 (5.3)
On the bus 2 (2.0) 5 (16.1) 7 (5.3)
Near bus station 3 (3.0) 0 (0) 3 (2.3)
Home 17 (17.0) 8 (25.8) 25 (19.1)
Other 20 (20.0) 5 (16.1) 25 (19.1)
Unknown 1 (1.0) 0 (0) 1 (0.8)
Number of persons injured or killed
One 44 (44.0) 15 (48.4) 59 (45.3)
Two 19 (19.0) 5 (16.1) 24 (18.3)
Three to four 18 (18.0) 5 (16.1) 23 (17.6)
Five to ten 16 (16.0) 3 (9.7) 19 (14.5)
More than ten 3 (3.0) 3 (9.7) 6 (4.6)
Total 100 31 131
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highest numbers of incidents (36 [27.4%], 27 [20.6%],
and 5 [3.8%], respectively, Table 1); other types of IEDs
caused 17 (13.0%) incidents. The type of explosive device
was unknown in 46 (35.1%) incidents (Table 1).
Almost all the records with missing data on sex, age,
place of incident and type of explosive device (except
one casualty with missing age and five incidents with
missing explosive type) were collected prior to October
of 2009, when surveillance data were collected solely
from media sources (Tables 1, 2).
Discussion
Numbers of intentional explosive incidents and casualties
in Nepal have decreased considerably since early 2008.
However, the overall situation in Nepal remains fragile, as
illustrated by the pronounced increase in both incidents
and casualties between July 2010 and June 2011.Most incidents in this study occurred in public pla-
ces—streets and crossroads, shops and markets, indus-
trial settings, buses, and places of work and worship.
Intentional explosive incidents in public places have
been common in other settings as well. 85% of deaths
resulting from 68 intentional explosions in Istanbul be-
tween 1976 and 2000, for example, were due to incidents
in public places [11]. Of 138 children injured in
intentional explosions in Israel during a 15-month
period in 2000-2001, 54% were injured in incidents on
the road and 36% were injured in incidents in public or
commercial buildings [12].
Almost one fifth of incidents in this study took place
in the home, a finding which is also corroborated by
data from other settings. Incidents in homes accounted
for 15.0% of 120 intentional explosion-related deaths in
Istanbul [11]. An earlier study of victim-activated explo-
sive events in Nepal between 2006 and 2010 found that
Figure 4 Time trends in numbers of casualties and incidents caused by intentional explosions in Nepal, 2008-2011.
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study—took place in the home [13].
Over 70% of incidents in our study for which the de-
vices are known were caused by sutali and socket
bombs, which are relatively small homemade explosives.
These same types of explosive devices were used in over
60% of victim-activated incidents occurring in Nepal be-
tween July 2006 and June 2010 [13].
Overall, incidents resulting in fewer casualties were
more common than incidents resulting in more casual-
ties: 45.3% of incidents involved only one casualty, while
only 4.6% resulted in 10 or more casualties. This is simi-
lar to findings for 138 victim-activated explosive inci-
dents in Nepal, of which 54.3% of incidents involved
only one casualty and only 1.4% resulted in 10 or more
casualties [13]. This trend is common to some other set-
tings as well. Of 77 explosive events in Northern Ireland,
for example, only 17% resulted in 6 or more casualties
and only 3 incidents resulted in more than 20 casualties
[14]. On the other hand, data from other countries indi-
cate higher numbers of casualties per incident; in a study
of 32 explosive events in Israel, for example, 25% of the
incidents resulted in more than 25 casualties [15].
Our dataset revealed an average of 3.3 casualties per
incident, which is relatively low compared to average
numbers in other settings. A review of 14 published
studies of 220 intentional explosive incidents worldwide
showed an average of 15.3 casualties per incident [16],
whereas individual country studies in Northern Ireland,
Indonesia, France, Turkey, and Israel reported average
values of 4.4 [14], 7.3 [17], 24.4 [18], 51.8 [19], and 63.3
[20], respectively.
The overall case-fatality ratio in the current dataset is
7.8%, which is lower than that of an earlier analysis of
victim-activated injuries in Nepal (13.7%) [13] and ana-
lyses in several other countries—some of which have
better developed health services than Nepal. Analyses ofmultiple explosive incidents found average case fatality
ratios of 12.4, 14.3, 16.1, 31.3, and 39.7% in Turkey [19],
Colombia [21], Israel [22], Thailand [23], and Indonesia
[17], respectively.
Data from this study and studies in other settings indi-
cate that numbers of casualties per incident and case-
fatality ratios are affected by explosive device type [24].
The predominant use in Nepal of small improvised de-
vices such as socket and sutali bombs, with relatively
small explosive charges, likely influences the relatively
low numbers of casualties per incident and case-fatality
ratio. Likewise, casualties per incident in Israel decreased
threefold between 1975 and 1979, assumed by Adler
et al. to result from smaller explosive charges used due
to tighter security measures [25].
The physical locations of incidents are also likely to
affect numbers of casualties per incident and case-
fatality ratios. In the current study, incidents on buses
and near stadiums claimed the highest numbers of cas-
ualties per incident (61 casualties in 7 incidents and 44
casualties in 2 incidents, respectively). Multiple studies
have shown that incidents in buses result in the most le-
thal types of injuries and the highest mortality rates
[15,20,22,26], while many others have discussed how the
physical location of an explosion can affect the type,
anatomical location, and severity of injuries [16,24,26]—
which, in turn, affect numbers of casualties per incident
and case-fatality ratios.
Almost 4 out of 5 casualties in this study were men, a
proportion higher than that found in an earlier study of
victim-activated explosive injuries in Nepal (69.4% male
overall, 61.6% male among adults) [13] but similar to the
sex distribution in studies of intentional explosions in
several other settings. Seventy-one percent of 339 cas-
ualties injured in intentional explosions in Northern
Ireland between 1972 and 1980 were male [14], whereas
81.7% of 120 people fatally injured in intentional
Table 2 Distribution of casualties due to intentional explosions by surveillance type, Nepal, 2008-2011 (N = 437)
Media surveillance Active surveillance Total casualties
Jan 08 –Sep 09 Oct 09 – Dec 11 N (% total)
N (% total) N (% total)
Sex
Male 255 (78.0) 86 (78.2) 341 (78.0)
Female 60 (18.3) 24 (21.8) 84 (19.2)
Unknown 12 (3.7) 0 (0) 12 (2.7)
Age group
Child (< 18 years) 25 (7.6) 15 (13.6) 40 (9.2)
Adult 192 (58.7) 94 (85.5) 286 (65.4)
Unknown 110 (33.6) 1 (0.9) 111 (25.4)
Outcome
Non-fatal injury 298 (91.1) 105 (95.5) 403 (92.2)
Fatal injury 29 (8.9) 5 (4.5) 34 (7.8)
Type of explosive device
Socket bomb 50 (15.3) 48 (43.6) 98 (22.4)
Sutali bomb 47 (14.4) 7 (6.4) 54 (12.4)
Pressure cooker bomb 16 (4.9) 6 (5.5) 22 (5.0)
Other improvised explosive device 87 (26.6) 41 (37.3) 128 (29.3)
Unknown 127 (38.8) 8 (7.3) 135 (30.9)
Place of incident
Busy street or crossroads 69 (21.1) 15 (13.6) 84 (19.2)
Shop or market 26 (8.0) 18 (16.4) 44 (10.1)
Place of worship 26 (8.0) 0 (0) 26 (5.9)
Near government or police office 28 (8.6) 1 (0.9) 29 (6.6)
Near school or hospital 5 (1.5) 0 (0) 5 (1.1)
Near stadium 44 (13.5) 0 (0) 44 (10.1)
Factory or industry 7 (2.1) 2 (1.8) 9 (2.1)
On the bus 9 (2.8) 52 (47.3) 61 (14.0)
Near bus station 18 (5.5) 0 (0) 18 (4.1)
Home 43 (13.1) 16 (14.5) 59 (13.5)
Other 50 (15.3) 6 (5.5) 56 (12.8)
Unknown 2 (0.6) 0 (0) 2 (0.5)
Total 327 110 437
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[11]. These data suggest that males in these places had a
much higher risk of injury than females, likely because
explosive devices were deployed and detonated in set-
tings and at times where and when males were more
likely to be present than females.
Of injuries in this study for which age is known, over
55% occurred in individuals aged 20-39 years and 9.2%
were among children (under 18 years of age). This find-
ing contrasts with data from victim-activated explosions
in Nepal, in which 55% of injuries occurred amongchildren and the highest numbers of injuries occurred
among individuals 5 to 19 years of age [13]. However,
the findings of the current study are similar to those in
other studies of intentional explosions. A study of 511
casualties at one Israeli hospital between 1975 and 1979
showed that over 40% of injuries occurred among people
aged 19-40 [25], and an analysis of national data in Israel
between 2000 and 2003 found that 49.2% and 21.1% of
casualties were 15-29 and 30-44 years old, respectively
[15]. Analysis of 120 explosive event deaths in
Istanbul between 1976 and 2000 found that 50% of
Figure 5 Age and sex distributions of fatal and non-fatal injuries caused by intentional explosions in Nepal, 2008-2011.
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mean age of 31.6 years for the current study is also
similar to means found in other settings: 30.9, 34.5,
and 34.8 years in Jerusalem [27], Paris [18], and
Istanbul [11], respectively. Over 45% of all casualties
in our study for whom age and sex are known were
males aged 20-39, indicating that males in this age
group are at the highest risk of injury.
Surveillance of intentional explosive device injuries
varies widely among countries. In some countries, hos-
pital and ambulance records are sufficiently complete to
conduct complex analyses, as in Israel [28], Northern
Ireland [14], and Thailand [23]. Systems such as the
Israel National Trauma Registry [12,15] and the Arson
and Explosives National Repository [29] and Bomb Data
Center [30] in the United States serve as national reposi-
tories for intentional explosion data. The RAND Corpor-
ation, the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute
for the Prevention of Terrorism [31], and the United
States Department of State [32] collect information on
explosive incidents worldwide, although their data likely
are undermined by the poor capacity of many countries
to collect information about such incidents.
National governments, health care facilities, and other
stakeholders with fewer resources may have difficulty
collecting data on intentional explosive incidents. A spe-
cial report on Indonesia described the difficulty of
collecting precise explosive injury data because hospitals
do not maintain disaster plans and do not always record
patient data properly [17]. Describing two explosive inci-
dents in Karachi, Umer et al. remind us that the quality
of care in some developing countries varies with social
status, meaning that injury victims with lower social sta-
tus may not receive care in the best—if any—hospitals
[33]. Such considerations must be taken into account
when considering venue-based surveillance data. An-
other barrier to reporting in all countries, regardless of
resources, lies in the difficulty of defining intentional ex-
plosive incidents as an injury category [34] and the lackof standardized definitions [35]. Variations in explosive
incident characteristics such as device type, activation
circumstances, and context (including armed conflict,
criminal activity, and intent to cause terror among civil-
ian populations) often lead to inconsistencies in defini-
tions and reporting practices.
Given its ability to overcome many of the challenges
faced by lower-income countries and its inclusion of
data points that are omitted from many data collection
systems, Nepal’s active community-based surveillance
system may serve as a model for other resource-
challenged settings. To our knowledge, this is the only
functioning active community-based surveillance system
for intentional explosion injuries. Because it collects data
from many sources we can assume that it possesses a
relatively high degree of sensitivity. Furthermore, pro-
spective data collection soon after incidents is likely to
lower the possibility of recall bias. The availability of
victim-activated explosive injury data from an overlap-
ping time period in Nepal [13], collected in the exact
same manner, afforded us the ability to compare and
contrast trends from victim-activated and intentional ex-
plosions in a similar setting.
This study is subject to several limitations. Early use of
media reporting for the surveillance system may mean
that data are missing or incorrect (due to use of poten-
tially biased or inaccurate media reports) between January
2008 and the start of active surveillance in 2009. The sys-
tem may also underestimate the magnitude of intentional
explosive injury due to the likely non-detection of some
cases and the exclusion of combatants from data collec-
tion.b Furthermore, the use of self-reported data is subject
to reporting bias.
Conclusions
Despite the overall decrease of injuries resulting from
intentional explosions during the study period, intentional
explosion incidents still pose a threat to the civilian popu-
lation of Nepal. Most incidents are caused by small
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http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/7/1/5homemade explosive devices and occur in public places,
and males aged 20 to 39 account for a plurality of casual-
ties. Nepali government bodies, UNICEF, and other part-
ners addressing the explosive device problem should
continue to use surveillance data to plan interventions.
Additional study of similarities and differences between
intentional and victim-activated explosive devices could
lead to improvement in prevention and response activities.
Further examination of how factors such as injury type
and anatomical location, setting, and the age and sex of
casualties predict injury outcomes—and comparison with
non-explosive traumatic injuries—could help medical pro-
fessionals better understand how to treat individuals in-
jured in intentional explosion events.Ethics approval
Exempted from review by the Institutional Review Board
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as the
primary intent of surveillance was determined to be
non-research. The study constitutes a secondary analysis
of surveillance data routinely collected for programmatic
purposes.Endnotes
aSome injury specialists classify any injury caused by
an explosive device—regardless of whether the device is
activated by the victim or another party—as intentional
because such devices are manufactured and deployed
with the intent to cause physical harm or terror. In this
article we use the term “intentional” to describe explo-
sive events and injuries knowingly activated by individ-
uals and groups in order to maintain consistency with
definitions used by the surveillance system in Nepal and
to differentiate between these events and those caused
by victim-activated explosions.
bThe burden of injuries caused by intentionally
deployed explosive devices is also likely underestimated
because some IEDs that are intentionally deployed or
launched fail to explode as intended. Unless cleared by
security forces, such devices left in public places remain
a threat to civilians and may cause victim-activated ex-
plosion injuries if detonated by tampering or other vic-
tim activities.Abbreviations
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